The present paper outlines potential shortcomings of analyzing events in high hazard systems. We argue that the efficiency of organizational learning within high hazard systems is at least partially undermined by the subjective theories of organizing held by their members. These subjective theories basically reflect an "engineering" understanding of "how a system and its components perform", and are assumed to involve (social-) psychological blind spots when applied to the analysis of events. More specifically, we argue that they neglect individual motives and goals that critically drive work performance and social interactions in high hazard systems. First, we focus on the process of identifying the causes of failed organizing within the course of an event analysis. Our analysis reveals a mismatch between the basic functional assumptions of the event analyst on the motives of social actors involved in an event and on the other hand, the perspective held by the social actors themselves. Second, we discuss the process of correcting failed social system performance after events. Thereby we draw on blind spots that emerge from the direct application of technical safety principles (i.e., standardization and redundancy) to the organization of social systems. Finally, we propose some future research strategies for developing event analysis methods which are aimed at improving an organization's learning potential. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.