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Behavioural attainability of evolutionarily stable strategies in repeated interactions
JournalArticle (Originalarbeit in einer wissenschaftlichen Zeitschrift)
 
ID 89162
Author(s) Dobler, Ralph; Kölliker, Mathias
Author(s) at UniBasel Kölliker, Mathias
Year 2009
Title Behavioural attainability of evolutionarily stable strategies in repeated interactions
Journal Animal behaviour
Volume 77
Number 6
Pages / Article-Number 1427-1434
Keywords behavioural dynamics, ESS, game theory, interacting phenotypes, parent-offspring conflict, social interaction
Abstract Theory for the evolution of social interactions based on continuous strategies often assumes for simplicity that expressed behaviours are independent of previous encounters. In reality, however, such dependencies are likely to be widespread and often strong, generating complex behavioural dynamics. To model this process and illustrate potential consequences for the evolution of behavioural interactions, we consider the behavioural dynamics of the interaction between caring parents and their demanding offspring, a prime example of long series of interdependent and highly dynamic interactions. These dynamics can be modelled using functions describing mechanisms for how parents and their offspring respond to each other in the interaction. We establish the general conditions under which the behavioural dynamics converge towards a proximate equilibrium and refer to such converging interactions as behaviourally stable strategies (BSSs). We further demonstrate that there is scope for behavioural instability under realistic conditions; that is, whenever parents and/or offspring 'overreact' beyond some threshold. By applying the derived condition for behavioural stability to evolutionary models of parent-offspring conflict resolution, we show by numerical simulations that evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) of current models are not necessarily behaviourally stable. Because behavioural instability implies that expressed levels of behaviours deviate from the ESS, behavioural stability is required for strict evolutionary stability in repeated behavioural interactions. (C) 2009 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Publisher Elsevier
ISSN/ISBN 0003-3472
edoc-URL http://edoc.unibas.ch/dok/A5251422
Full Text on edoc Available
Digital Object Identifier DOI 10.1016/j.anbehav.2009.02.013
ISI-Number WOS:000266884200010
Document type (ISI) Article
 
   

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