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Bureaucrats in parliament: theory and evidence on its determinants in Germany
Discussion paper / Internet publication
ID 61733
Author(s) Brändle, Thomas; Stutzer, Alois
Author(s) at UniBasel Brändle, Thomas
Stutzer, Alois
Year 2008
Month and day 09-01
Title Bureaucrats in parliament: theory and evidence on its determinants in Germany
Series title WWZ Discussion Papers
Volume 2008
Number 07
Publisher / Institution WWZ
Keywords Political selection, parliamentary election, public servants, incompatibility
Abstract This paper addresses the personal linkages between the public administration and the legislature that emerge because public servants pursue a political mandate. There are concerns that the strong representation of bureaucrats in many Western parliaments compromises the constitutionally proposed political neutrality of the public service and generates a conflict of interest. We present a cost-benefit calculus and analyze specific legal provisions for the German Laender to understand the selection of public servants into parliaments. Based on a novel data set, we find that incompatibility rules decrease and abeyance compensation increases the fraction of public servants in Laender parliaments.
Full Text on edoc Available

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