Data Entry: Please note that the research database will be replaced by UNIverse by the end of October 2023. Please enter your data into the system Thanks

Login for users with Unibas email account...

Login for registered users without Unibas email account...

Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention
Discussion paper / Internet publication
ID 4597164
Author(s) Balles, Patrick; Matter, Ulrich; Stutzer, Alois
Author(s) at UniBasel Balles, Patrick
Matter, Ulrich
Stutzer, Alois
Year 2020
Month and day 04-24
Title Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention
Series title WWZ Working Paper
Volume 2020
Number 06
Pages 79
Publisher / Institution WWZ
Keywords Attention, campaign finance, interest groups, legislative voting, mass media, roll call voting, US House of Representatives
Abstract We examine whether representatives are more likely to serve long-term campaign donors instead of constituents during times of low media attention to politics. Based on 425 roll calls between 2005 and 2014 in the US House of Representatives, we show that representatives are more likely to vote with special interests and against constituency interests when the two are in conflict. Importantly, the latter effect is significantly larger when there is less attention on politics due to exogenous newsworthy events. The opportunistic behavior seems not to be mediated by short-term scheduling of sensitive votes right after distracting events.
Full Text on edoc Available

MCSS v5.8 PRO. 0.400 sec, queries - 0.000 sec ©Universität Basel  |  Impressum   |