Crisis bargaining in the European Union: Formal rules or market pressure?
JournalArticle (Originalarbeit in einer wissenschaftlichen Zeitschrift)
ID 4527662
Author(s) Finke, Daniel; Bailer, Stefanie
Author(s) at UniBasel Bailer, Stefanie
Year 2019
Title Crisis bargaining in the European Union: Formal rules or market pressure?
Journal European Union Politics
Volume 20
Number 1
Pages / Article-Number 109-133
Keywords Agenda setting power, bargaining models, Economic and Monetary Union, formalpower, negotiations
Abstract To what extent did the European Monetary Union crisis alter the logic of European Union decision making? We analyze the relevance of asymmetric market pressures as compared to that of formal voting and agenda setting rules by applying three established bargaining models to the 'EMU Positions' data. Accounting for the interdependence between issues and agreements, we locate actors' positions on three reform dimensions, namely the level of fiscal discipline, transfer payments and institutionalization. We find that market pressure during the height of the Eurozone crisis was particularly relevant, and that debtor countries were weakened by their difficulty in refinancing their public debt. Our finding shows that formal rules determining agenda setting and veto rights remain relevant even in times of crisis.
Publisher Sage
ISSN/ISBN 1465-1165 ; 1741-2757
Full Text on edoc No
Digital Object Identifier DOI 10.1177/1465116518814949
ISI-Number WOS:000460280500006
Document type (ISI) Article

MCSS v5.8 PRO. 0.442 sec, queries - 0.000 sec ©Universität Basel  |  Impressum   |