A Note on Bayesian Nash Equilibria in Imperfectly Discriminating Contests

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A Note on Bayesian Nash Equilibria in Imperfectly Discriminating Contests

JournalArticle (Originalarbeit in einer wissenschaftlichen Zeitschrift)

ID	4516128
Author(s)	Wasser, Cédric
Author(s) at UniBasel	Wasser, Cédric
Year	2013
Title	A Note on Bayesian Nash Equilibria in Imperfectly Discriminating Contests
Journal	Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume	66
Number	2
Pages / Article-Number	180-182
Abstract	The literature on imperfectly discriminating contests has almost exclusively focused on complete information. We study such contests assuming players have private information. We identify a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests for which findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies. The main assumptions are that a player’s valuation of winning is increasing in the signal he observes and that a player’s probability of winning is continuous in the efforts of all players as well as increasing in his own effort.
Publisher	Elsevier
ISSN/ISBN	0165-489
edoc-URL	https://edoc.unibas.ch/72616/
Full Text on edoc	No
Digital Object Identifier DOI	10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.03.001
ISI-Number	WOS:000322926400011
Document type (ISI)	Article

25/04/2024

Research Database / FORSCHUNGSDATENBANK