Logo der Universität Basel

Research Database / FORSCHUNGSDATENBANK 
PRINTDOC
 
Publication 4514681 | Verified
Decentralization with porous borders: Public production in a federation with tax competition and spillovers
JournalArticle (Originalarbeit in einer wissenschaftlichen Zeitschrift)
 
ID 4514681
Author(s) Armbruster, Stephanie; Hintermann, Beat
Author(s) at UniBasel Hintermann, Beat
Armbruster, Stephanie
Year 2020
Year: comment OnlineFirst
Title Decentralization with porous borders: Public production in a federation with tax competition and spillovers
Journal International Tax and Public Finance
Volume 27
Number 3
Pages / Article-Number 606-642
Abstract We analyze the strategic interaction of regional and federal governments using a model that includes fiscal externalities in the form of inter-regional capital tax competition and technical externalities in the form of inter-regional spillovers. The federal government aims to correct for these inefficiencies using a transfer system. If the regional governments are policy leaders (such that federal policy is set conditional on regional choices), they will internalize both fiscal and technical externalities but free-ride on the transfer system. Efficiency can be achieved by introducing a second transfer scheme that is independent of regional public production. If the federal government sets its policy first and can commit itself to it, the outcome is efficient only if matching grants are used that are financed outside of the transfer system.
Publisher Springer
ISSN/ISBN 0927-5940 ; 1573-6970
edoc-URL https://edoc.unibas.ch/73866/
Full Text on edoc Available
Digital Object Identifier DOI 10.1007/s10797-019-09572-7
ISI-Number WOS:000488931200001
Document type (ISI) Article
 
   

MCSS v5.8 PRO. 0.319 sec, queries - 0.000 sec ©Universität Basel  |  Impressum   |    
01/04/2023