The Welfare Costs of Tiebout Sorting with True Public Goods
Discussion paper / Internet publication
ID 4496265
Digital Object Identifier DOI 10.1007/s10797-019-09534-z
Author(s) Kuhlmey, Florian; Hintermann, Beat
Author(s) at UniBasel Kuhlmey, Florian
Hintermann, Beat
Year 2018
Month and day 12-06
Title The Welfare Costs of Tiebout Sorting with True Public Goods
Series title WWZ Working Papers
Volume 2019
Number 01
Pages 54
Publisher / Institution WWZ
Keywords H21, H23, H41, H77; R13, R23, R50; Q58
Abstract We develop a model of Tiebout sorting based on decentralized income taxation, which allows for spillovers and imperfect rivalry in consumption of the publicly provided good. We identify three sources of welfare loss from decentralization: Imperfect redistribution, inter-jurisdictional free-riding, and inecient residential choice. Whereas the welfare loss from imperfect redistribution decreases and that from free-riding rises unambiguously as the publicly provided good becomes more pure, the welfare loss from the inecient residential choice depends non-monotonically on spillovers and rivalry. The equilibrium can be characterized by relative crowding of either the rich or the poor municipality. Our results imply that the characteristics of the publicly provided good are an important determinant for the welfare costs of decentralization.
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