Crisis bargaining in the European Union: Formal rules or market pressure?
JournalArticle (Originalarbeit in einer wissenschaftlichen Zeitschrift)
ID 4495258
Author(s) Finke, Daniel; Bailer, Stefanie
Author(s) at UniBasel Bailer, Stefanie
Year 2018
Title Crisis bargaining in the European Union: Formal rules or market pressure?
Journal European Union Politics
Pages / Article-Number 1-25
Keywords Agenda setting power, bargaining models, Economic and Monetary Union, formal power, negotiations
Abstract To what extent did the European Monetary Union crisis alter the logic of European Union decision making? We analyze the relevance of asymmetric market pressures as compared to that of formal voting and agenda setting rules by applying three established bargaining models to the 'EMU Positions' data. Accounting for the interdependence between issues and agreements, we locate actors' positions on three reform dimensions, namely the level of fiscal discipline, transfer payments and institutionalization. We find that market pressure during the height of the Eurozone crisis was particularly relevant, and that debtor countries were weakened by their difficulty in refinancing their public debt. Our finding shows that formal rules determining agenda setting and veto rights remain relevant even in times of crisis.
Publisher Sage
ISSN/ISBN 1741-2757
Full Text on edoc Available
Digital Object Identifier DOI 10.1177/1465116518814949

MCSS v5.8 PRO. 0.614 sec, queries - 0.000 sec ©Universität Basel  |  Impressum   |