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Robust policy schemes for R&D games with asymmetric information
Discussion paper / Internet publication
 
ID 4266049
Author(s) Bondarev, Anton
Author(s) at UniBasel Bondarev, Anton
Year 2018
Month and day 01-16
Title Robust policy schemes for R&D games with asymmetric information
Series title WWZ Working Papers
Volume 2018
Number 01
Pages 24
Publisher / Institution WWZ, University of Basel
Keywords technology lock-in, technological change, strategic interaction, uncertainty, robust policy sets, uncertainty thresholds, robust welfare improving policy, axiom of choice
Abstract We consider an abstract setting of the differential r&d game, where participating firms are allowed for strategic behavior. We assume the information asymmetry across those firms and the government, which seeks to support newer technologies in a socially optimal manner. We develop a general theory of robust subsidies under such one-sided uncertainty and establish results on relative optimality, duration and size of different policy tools available to the government. It turns out that there might exist multiple sets of second-best robust policies, but there always exist a naturally induced ordering across such sets, implying the optimal choice of a policy exists for the government under different uncertainty levels.
edoc-URL https://edoc.unibas.ch/61298/
Full Text on edoc Available
 
   

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