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Political selection of public servants and parliamentary oversight
Discussion paper / Internet publication
ID 396437
Author(s) Braendle, Thomas; Stutzer, Alois
Author(s) at UniBasel Brändle, Thomas
Stutzer, Alois
Year 2010
Month and day 06-18
Title Political selection of public servants and parliamentary oversight
Series title WWZ Discussion Papers
Volume 2010
Number 08
Publisher / Institution WWZ
Keywords Political selection, parliamentary oversight, public servants, interpellations

In this paper, we integrate the identity of legislators in a politico-economic analysis of parliamentary oversight whereby oversight activities depend on individual control costs and incentives. We focus on public servants selected into parliament who face a conflict of interests but also have lower control costs due to their experience and information advantage. If held accountable, oversight becomes a relatively attractive activity for them to win votes. Based on a novel data set for German Laender, we find that the fraction of public servants in parliament is positively related to the number of submitted parliamentary interpellations.

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