A tractable analysis of contagious equilibria
JournalArticle (Originalarbeit in einer wissenschaftlichen Zeitschrift)
 
ID 2778543
Author(s) Camera, Gabriele; Gioffré, Alessandro
Author(s) at UniBasel Camera, Gabriele
Year 2014
Title A tractable analysis of contagious equilibria
Journal Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume 50
Pages / Article-Number 290-300
Abstract This paper studies contagious equilibrium in infinitely repeated matching games. The innovation is to identify a key statistic of contagious punishment that, used together with a recursive formulation, generates tractable closed-form expressions for continuation payoffs, off equilibrium. This allows a transparent characterization of the dynamic incentives created by contagious punishment schemes.
Publisher Elsevier
ISSN/ISBN 0304-4068
URL https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/mateco/v50y2014icp290-300.html
edoc-URL http://edoc.unibas.ch/42856/
Full Text on edoc No
Digital Object Identifier DOI 10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.07.003
ISI-Number 000331986500030
Document type (ISI) Article
 
   

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