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Should the treasury price discriminate? : a procedure for computing hypothetical bid functions
JournalArticle (Originalarbeit in einer wissenschaftlichen Zeitschrift)
 
ID 109305
Author(s) Heller, Daniel; Lengwiler, Yvan
Author(s) at UniBasel Lengwiler, Yvan
Year 2001
Title Should the treasury price discriminate? : a procedure for computing hypothetical bid functions
Journal Journal of institutional and theoretical economics
Volume 157
Number 3
Pages / Article-Number 413-429
Abstract Ever since Friedman (1959), it has been debated whether the Treasury should sell bonds in a uniform or in a discriminatory auction. Empirical research on this topic has been confined to experiments in which both auctions were used. But these experiments inherently contain an identification problem, since differences cannot be attributed to the auction format alone. We develop a method for generating counterfactual data on discriminatory auctions, using real data from uniform-price Treasury bond auctions in Switzerland. Our method allows us to investigate the performance of the two auctions without relying on experiments and without the identification problem.
Publisher J. C. B. Mohr
ISSN/ISBN 0932-4569
edoc-URL http://edoc.unibas.ch/dok/A5253747
Full Text on edoc Available
Digital Object Identifier DOI 10.1628/0932456013621279
ISI-Number WOS:000172033500003
Document type (ISI) Article
 
   

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30/04/2024