

Research Project Game Theoretical Analysis of Proof of Stake

Project funded by own resources

Project title Game Theoretical Analysis of Proof of Stake Principal Investigator(s) Markheim, Marina ; Project Members Markheim, Marina ; Organisation / Research unit Faculty of Business and Economics Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften Project start 01.09.2018 Probable end 31.12.2022 Status Completed In a decentralized system, no one can be forced to honor or i obligation, any disagreement will threaten to split the system

In a decentralized system, no one can be forced to honor or implement a given set of rules. Without such obligation, any disagreement will threaten to split the system, where one part of the network chooses to implement one set of rules, and the other part of the network chooses to use a different set of rules. To avoid such splits, consensus rules need to be self-enforcing, that is, they must induce a Nash equilibrium or some other related game-theoretic equilibrium concept.

Our project investigates how consensus in blockchain based distributed systems can be achieved; namely, under which conditions network participants agree to use a given set of rules. For our analysis of consensus in blockchain based distributed systems, our focus will be on a game-theoretic analysis of the proof-of-stake and the proof-of-work consensus mechanisms.

Keywords blockchain, proof of stake, consensus mechanism, game theory **Financed by** University funds

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