

Publication

Bureaucratic rents and life satisfaction

JournalArticle (Originalarbeit in einer wissenschaftlichen Zeitschrift)

ID 41816

Author(s) Luechinger, Simon; Meier, Stephan; Stutzer, Alois

Author(s) at UniBasel [Stutzer, Alois](#) ;

Year 2008

Title Bureaucratic rents and life satisfaction

Journal Journal of law, economics, & organization

Volume 24

Number 2

Pages / Article-Number 476-488

Institutions affect bureaucrats' possibilities to acquire rents; they determine the degree of accountability and responsiveness of officials and of political control of the bureaucracy and, thereby, the size and distribution of rents in the public sphere. Those rents can involve higher wages, monetary and nonmonetary fringe benefits, and bribes. We propose a direct measure to capture the total of these rents: the difference in subjective well-being between bureaucrats and people working in the private sector. In a sample of 42 countries, we find large variations in the extent of rents in the public bureaucracy. The extent of rents is determined by differences in institutional and political constraints. In particular, we find judicial independence to be of major relevance for a tamed bureaucracy. Further, our measure for rents correlates with indicators of regulatory policies and perceptions of corruption.

Publisher Yale Univ. Press

ISSN/ISBN 8756-6222

edoc-URL <http://edoc.unibas.ch/dok/A5248803>

Full Text on edoc Available;

Digital Object Identifier DOI 10.1093/jleo/ewm057

ISI-Number 000259204100010

Document type (ISI) Article