



Universität
Basel

Research Project

Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention

Project funded by own resources

Project title Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention

Principal Investigator(s) [Stutzer, Alois](#) ;

Co-Investigator(s) [Balles, Patrick](#) ; [Matter, Ulrich](#) ;

Organisation / Research unit

Departement Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Politische Ökonomie (Stutzer)

Project start 01.10.2016

Probable end 31.12.2037

Status Active

This project examines whether interest groups are more successful in shaping legislation in their favor during periods of low media attention to politics. The underlying rationale is that legislators get less likely disciplined by their voters since news on the legislative process are crowded out during these times. In our analysis based on 1,386 roll calls on 1,298 different bills between 2005 and 2014 in the US Congress, we exploit exogenous variation in public attention to the lawmaking process and find strong evidence supporting this mechanism. Our findings suggest that policy-makers manage to schedule votes that are sensitive to moneyed interests into periods that coincide with newsworthy events, turning the focus away from Congress. Whereas this mechanism is possible in the House, the institutional setting limits such actions in the Senate.

Keywords Campaign finance, legislative voting, attention, mass media, interest groups

Financed by

University funds

Add publication

Add documents

Specify cooperation partners

ID	Kreditinhaber	Kooperationspartner	Institution	Laufzeit - von	Laufzeit - bis
4087865	Stutzer, Alois	Matter, Ulrich, Assistant Professor	University of St. Gallen	01.08.2017	31.12.2037